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Serotonergic (or “classic”) psychedelics have struck many researchers as raising significant 
philosophical questions that, until recently, were largely unexplored by academic philosophers. 
This paper provides an overview of four emerging lines of research at the intersection of 
academic philosophy and psychedelic science that have gained considerable traction in the last 
decade: selfless consciousness, psychedelic epistemology, psychedelic ethics, and 
spiritual/religious naturalism. In this paper, we highlight philosophical questions concerning (i) 
psychedelics, self-consciousness, and phenomenal consciousness, (ii) the epistemic profile of 
the psychedelic experience; (iii) ethical concerns about the appropriate use of psychedelics; 
and (iv) whether spiritual or religious dimensions of psychedelic use are compatible with a 
naturalistic worldview.  
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Serotonergic (or “classic”) psychedelics are the objects of renewed scientific interest. These 
psychoactive substances can induce dramatic changes to perception, cognition, and emotion, 
primarily via agonism of the serotonin-2a (5-HT2a) receptor in the brain. In a spate of recent 
trials, they have shown promise as treatments for psychiatric disorders (Wheeler and Dyer, 
2020), as agents that promote well-being in healthy volunteers (Gandy, 2019), and as research 
tools for probing the neural substrates of cognition and consciousness (Carhart-Harris, 2019). 
 Over the years, psychedelics have struck many researchers as raising significant 
philosophical questions (Smythies, 1953; Osmond, 1971; Shanon, 2001). Noted intellectuals 
have discussed some of these questions (Huxley, 1954/2009), in some cases even in the pages 
of philosophy journals (Smith, 1964). However, only in the second decade of the twenty-first 
century have psychedelics begun to receive detailed attention from those whose primary 
training and specialization is in academic philosophy. 
In this paper we review four emerging lines of research at the intersection of academic 
philosophy and psychedelic science. The first concerns the use of psychedelic evidence in 
philosophical theorizing about the mind. Here, the most-discussed question is whether 
psychedelic research reveals the existence of totally selfless conscious states. The second 
concerns the epistemic status of the psychedelic state: Despite its misrepresentational 
components, might subjects gain genuine forms of knowledge from the psychedelic experience? 
The third line of research concerns ethical issues: Is it morally problematic to administer 
psychedelics if they pose epistemic risks? Does the therapeutic use of psychedelics require an 
“enhanced consent” process in order to be ethically justifiable? Might psychedelics constitute 
effective moral enhancement agents? The fourth, and final, line of research concerns religion 
and spirituality: Does psychedelic evidence reveal the existence of genuine forms of religious 
or spiritual practices that are compatible with a naturalistic worldview?  
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 A note on method and scope is in order. We have made no attempt at a systematic 
literature search. These four lines of inquiry do not exhaust the interactions between philosophy 
and psychedelic research; they are simply the most prominent areas of interest to emerge in the 
academic literature over the past decade. This is a narrative review, and is not based on a formal 
literature search; nonetheless, we have applied certain exclusion criteria. We focus mainly on 
peer-reviewed scholarly work in English published from 2010-2020 inclusive. We restrict 
ourselves to work that is devoted primarily to addressing (a) distinctively philosophical 
questions (b) as they arise in relation to recent psychedelic research. Finally, we restrict 
ourselves to work discussing the “classic”, 5-HT2A agonist psychedelics such as LSD, 
mescaline, psilocybin, and DMT. 
 
MIND 
Perhaps the most obvious philosophical application of psychedelic research is as a source of 
evidence for the philosophy of mind. The recent interdisciplinary enterprise of philosophical 
psychopathology (Graham and Stephens, 1994) is predicated on the idea that the study of 
unusual states of mind can inform philosophical theorizing in this domain. Psychedelics induce 
intense and unusual experiences which many volunteers rank among the most meaningful of 
their lives (Griffiths et al. 2006, 2016). It has been suggested repeatedly that psychedelics 
constitute a valuable tool for the investigation of mental phenomena, since, under conducive 
circumstances, they can reliably induce states of consciousness that otherwise occur only 
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Selfless consciousness  
Of the many changes to consciousness that psychedelics induce, the one that has attracted most 
attention in recent philosophy is the profound alteration to self-consciousness known as ego 
dissolution (Nour et al., 2016). Subjects administered moderate-to-high doses of psychedelics 
often report that the ordinary sense of self is radically altered or altogether absent. Some authors 
(e.g., Letheby and Gerrans, 2017) have argued that such experiences suggest a metaphysically 
anti-realist view about the self. However, most discussion has focused on what such 
experiences may reveal about the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. 
Might some psychedelic states constitute counterexamples to the influential thesis that 
phenomenal consciousness necessarily involves some form of self-consciousness? Millière 
(2017) calls this the Self-Awareness Principle (SAP): “(SAP) Necessarily, whenever one is in 
a conscious state, one is minimally self-aware” (p. 14). 
 
Billon and Kriegel (2015) have discussed putative counterexamples to SAP such as “disowned” 
mental states occurring in depersonalization disorder (DPD). These authors concede that, in 
some such cases, the evidence for a total loss of self-consciousness or self-awareness is 
compelling; however, they suggest that in such cases, the relevant mental states may not, after 
all, be phenomenally conscious (Billon and Kriegel, 2015). (Note: we use the terms “self-
consciousness” and “self-awareness” interchangeably and in a purely phenomenological sense 
that is neutral on the metaphysics of the self.) Millière (2017) argues that this line of defence 
cannot work in relation to certain states of psychedelic ego dissolution. In some cases, he 
contends, the evidence for a total loss of self-consciousness is very strong—some subjects are 
reluctant to use the first-person pronoun in their retrospective descriptions—yet “self-reports 
clearly converge in indicating that [ego dissolution] is a conscious experience… that is 
memorable” (Millière, 2017 p. 14). Similarly, Millière et al. (2018) focus on experiences 
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reported by those who smoke the intense, short-acting psychedelic 5-MeO-DMT. Users of this 
substance often report an experience of emptiness, nothingness, or void, which would seem to 
lack self-consciousness entirely but clearly is a memorable conscious experience. 
 Thus, a psychedelic argument against SAP has been advanced in the literature. If 
Millière (2017) is correct, then the approach taken by Billon and Kriegel (2015)—arguing that 
the relevant mental states lack phenomenal consciousness—will not work as a response to this 
argument. However, other responses have been offered by proponents of SAP. One response 
appeals to the notion of for-me-ness, drawn from the phenomenological tradition in philosophy. 
For-me-ness is sometimes described as the most minimal form of self-consciousness possible. 
According to its proponents, it is not simply one content of consciousness among others, but 
an ineliminable structural feature of conscious experience as such: 
“…the “me” of for-me-ness is not in the first instance an aspect of what is experienced 
but of how it is experienced; not an object of experience, but a constitutive manner of 
experiencing. To deny that such a feature is present in our experiential life, to deny the 
for-me-ness or mineness [sic] of experience, is to fail to recognize the very subjectivity 
of experience […] once anything occurs consciously, it must be given to the subject and 
thus exhibit for-me-ness. In other words, the “me” of for-me-ness is not a separate and 
distinct item but rather a pervasive feature of experiential life as such” (Zahavi & Kriegel, 
2015, p. 38, emphasis in original). 
 
Such philosophers argue that the presence of this phenomenological feature is revealed by a 
pervasive epistemic asymmetry: I enjoy a kind of direct access to my own experiences that is 
utterly unlike anyone else’s access to those experiences. This, it is claimed, shows that these 
experiences are given first-personally to me, the subject of experience, and therefore exhibit 
for-me-ness. Henriksen and Parnas (2019) respond along these lines to Millière’s (2017) 
psychedelic argument against SAP. According to Henriksen and Parnas, even psychedelic 
experiences featuring extreme disruptions to self-awareness are still “first-personally manifest 
to the subject of experience and not to anybody else” (2019, p. 15); thus, these experiences 
retain for-me-ness.  
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 Letheby (2020) advances a psychedelic argument against SAP that is similar to that 
given by Millière and contends that the for-me-ness response (which he calls the Universalist 
Objection) will not work. Authors like Henriksen and Parnas (2019) infer the presence of for-
me-ness, a putatively phenomenological feature, from the presence of an epistemic asymmetry: 
From the fact that I have a unique kind of direct access to my experiences, such authors infer 
that my experiences must possess some specific phenomenological feature. However, 
according to Letheby (2020), this sort of response is question-begging. Nobody denies the fact 
of epistemic asymmetry, but whether the presence of this asymmetry necessarily entails the 
presence of some phenomenological feature is precisely the point at issue. Letheby (2020) 
claims that proponents of for-me-ness are inconsistent in how they define this feature, and 
poses a dilemma: either it is a genuinely phenomenological feature, in which case some 
psychedelic experiences clearly lack it, or it is a mere matter of epistemic asymmetry, and 
therefore irrelevant to questions about self-consciousness. 
 The psychedelic argument against SAP has also been criticized by Sebastián (2020), 
who advocates a notion, similar to for-me-ness, which he calls perspectival first-personal (PFP) 
awareness. Sebastián agrees with Millière and Letheby that the putative universality of PFP 
awareness is subject to empirical test and could, in principle, be refuted by phenomenological 
reports of altered states. However, he does not think that the existing psychedelic evidence 
refutes SAP, for two reasons. The first is that extant descriptions of psychedelic ego dissolution 
(he contends) are ambiguous between two possibilities: (i) the experience was one of total ego-
loss, i.e., it lacked all forms of self-consciousness, or (ii) the experience was one of total ego-
expansion or unity, i.e., it retained a sense of self but lacked a sense of self/world boundaries. 
The second reason is that phenomenological reports may be subject to interpretive bias. 
Sebastián points out, first, that certain cultures with traditions of ritual psychedelic use do not 
emphasise experiences of ego dissolution, and second, that neo-Buddhist ideas about the non-
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existence of the self or the “death of the ego” have strongly influenced conceptualizations of 
psychedelic experience in the popular Western imagination. As such, he recommends future 
trials with new, tailor-made psychometric instruments, and careful controls for cultural 
influence, in order to determine whether some psychedelic states really falsify SAP (Sebastián, 
2020). 
 Another potential problem for the psychedelic argument against SAP concerns the 
status of retrospective phenomenological reports of totally selfless states. Metzinger (2003) has 
argued that such reports create a “performative self-contradiction”, because (i) the content of 
such reports is that the self was absent from the earlier experience, but (ii) this is contradicted 
by a presupposition of giving a sincere retrospective autobiographical report: namely, that the 
self was present in the earlier experience. Fink (2020) considers several ways of interpreting 
such reports, and argues that on many interpretations, no contradiction arises. However, he 
ultimately agrees with Metzinger that a contradiction arises if such reports are taken to describe 
states of total ego dissolution. Similarly to Sebastián (2020), Fink suggests that states described 
as total ego dissolution might really be unitive experiences of ego expansion. On the other hand, 
Millière (2020) argues that there is no contradiction: the content of the relevant reports is that 
the earlier experience lacked self-awareness, a phenomenological feature, not that the 
metaphysical self or subject was absent. He considers a different construal of Metzinger’s 
objection which focuses on the mechanisms of autobiographical and episodic memory, and 
argues that our best scientific understanding of these phenomena suggests there is no 
insurmountable obstacle to trusting reports of this kind. 
 In short, some reports of psychedelic experience seem to present counterexamples to 
the philosophical thesis that all conscious experiences are accompanied by some minimal form 
of self-consciousness. However, the interpretation of the thesis itself and of the relevant reports 
is highly contentious. It is safe to say that more research is required. 




Other issues in philosophy of mind 
The debate over ego dissolution and SAP is the most prominent, but not the only, discussion 
of psychedelic evidence in the philosophy of mind. The popular claim that the psychedelic state 
constitutes a “higher” state of consciousness has been scrutinised critically in light of recent 
work on levels and dimensions of consciousness (Bayne and Carter, 2018, Fortier-Davy and 
Millière, 2020).  Other authors have discussed whether psychedelic evidence might favour 
certain metaphysical positions on the classical mind-body problem (Kastrup, 2016, Jones, 
2019).  In contrast, others have suggested that psychedelic evidence might aid ongoing efforts 
to solve the so-called “Hard Problem of Consciousness” within a physicalist framework 
(Brogaard and Gatzia 2016a), and explanations of key psychedelic phenomena have been 
offered in terms of empirically-based theories of phenomenal consciousness (O’Brien and Opie, 
2015, Gallimore, 2015, Grinde and Stewart, 2020). Another project involves the use of 
conceptual tools from the phenomenological tradition in philosophy to analyse and describe 
the psychedelic state, thereby putatively advancing the project of classical phenomenology 
itself (Szummer et al. 2017, 2019, Horváth et al. 2018). Finally, Brogaard and colleagues have 
used data from psychedelic neuroscience to develop empirically-informed philosophical 
accounts of mental phenomena such as synaesthesia (Brogaard 2013, Brogaard and Gatzia 
2016b) and attention (Kentridge and Brogaard 2017). 
 
KNOWLEDGE 
Another line of inquiry concerns the epistemic status of the psychedelic experience: Does 
psychedelic administration reliably facilitate the acquisition of certain kinds of knowledge? 
Under conducive circumstances, psychedelics can induce mystical-type experiences which 
appear phenomenologically indistinguishable from those described by religious practitioners 
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throughout the ages (Pahnke 1963, Griffiths et al., 2006). As such, some have claimed that 
psychedelic subjects can gain direct knowledge of the existence of a cosmic consciousness or 
divine Ground of Being (Smith, 2000/2003; Richards 2015). However, in recent years some 
philosophers have examined the epistemic status of the psychedelic experience within the 
confines of a naturalistic worldview that eschews such posits. Might psychedelic 
administration facilitate genuine knowledge acquisition, even if the natural world described by 
science is all that exists? 
 While his specific focus is ayahuasca, Shanon (2010) makes several proposals which 
might be applicable to other psychedelics too. First, he suggests that psychedelic users can gain 
psychological insights, becoming aware of facts about their own personality and behaviour, as 
well as gaining insights into how their minds work. Subjects often report such apparent insights, 
and there is some evidence that these correlate with reductions in psychiatric symptoms 
(Carhart-Harris et al. 2018, Davis et al., 2020). Shanon also suggests that subjects can gain 
psychological insights into others’ minds, when psychedelics are taken in a group setting. On 
the first count, however, he does not consider the possibility that some apparent insights might 
be merely apparent. He does not offer an explicit argument for thinking that psychedelics 
induce genuine insights, rather than spurious insights that feel convincing (cf. Carhart-Harris 
and Friston, 2019; Jopling 2001). He does suggest, however, that the accuracy of psychological 
insights concerning other people can and should be tested empirically (Shanon, 2010, p. 268). 
 Shanon also suggests that ayahuasca users can gain certain kinds of knowledge 
concerning the natural world and other forms of life. Here, he does not seem to be referring to 
the discovery of new empirical facts. Rather, he seems to have in mind something like what 
philosophers have called “new knowledge of old facts” (Nida-Rümelin and Conaill, 2019): 
“The following example of my own happened during an ayahuasca session held in a hut, 
in the midst of the Amazonian Forest, early in the morning. I was looking at the leaves 
of plants observing how they were directed towards the rays of the sun. I felt I was 
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actually seeing the nurturing sustenance of the solar light. Have I obtained any 
“information” I had not known beforehand? I doubt it. But I was open to see the world 
in a new light, perhaps in the manner a poet or an artist may. As many have stated, a key 
function of paintings is to make people see things afresh, in a new light. Other cases 
pertaining to this category that I and my informants have experienced concerned the 
eternal cycles of life, life and death, social interaction and love, the harmonious being of 
animals in the wild and biological evolution” (Shanon 2010., p. 268). 
 
Shanon also notes that users of ayahuasca often start asking distinctively philosophical 
questions and espousing classic philosophical positions, even without any prior education in 
philosophy. In particular, he claims that ayahuasca intake leads users to adopt a consistent 
metaphysical worldview: an idealistic monism with a pantheistic flavour, similar to what 
Aldous Huxley dubbed the Perennial Philosophy. Shanon does not claim that ayahuasca users 
come to know the truth of this view through their experiences. He notes, however, that this 
striking cross-personal commonality requires explanation, and may tell us something important 
about the architecture of the mind (Shanon, 2010).  
 Shanon offers several other suggestions about types of knowledge gain that might occur 
during the ayahuasca experience. Some of these would seem to fall under the philosophical 
rubric of knowledge-how. For example, he observes that people who participate in ritual singing 
and dancing under ayahuasca seem to exhibit a remarkable degree of stamina and coordination. 
He also claims that, with repeated consumption, users may become skilled in “the very art of 
drinking ayahuasca”—an “artful skill in its own right” (Shanon, 2010, p. 272-273). Referring 
to the phenomenon of medical practitioners using ayahuasca to make diagnoses, Shanon argues 
that this practice is efficacious, but does not operate via the paranormal mechanisms that such 
practitioners posit; rather, the ayahuasca state allows practitioners to make better use of their 
existing specialist knowledge. Shanon also mentions enhancements to “well-being, overall 
comportment, and wisdom” (2010, p. 270) during the ayahuasca experience as putative 
epistemic benefits, and, finally, points out that simply by having extremely novel types of 
experiences, subjects are gaining new knowledge about their own consciousness. 
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 This last point connects with a proposal made by Letheby (2015): that psychedelic 
experience allows subjects to gain knowledge by acquaintance with certain facts about their 
own minds. Russell (1910) originally defined knowledge by acquaintance as direct knowledge, 
with no representational mediation between the mind and the object of knowledge; however, 
Letheby adopts an intuitive understanding of this term. He points out that there are two facts 
about the mind that are easy to know indirectly, through others’ testimony, but harder to know 
through one’s own experience: first, that one’s mind has vast potential that normally goes 
unrealized, including the potential for harmonious states of mystical wonder and joy, and, 
second, that one’s ordinary sense of self is contingent and constructed, resulting from 
representational processes in the brain (Letheby, 2015). He cites evidence that brain activity 
under psychedelics becomes more disorderly or entropic (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014) due to 
the disruption of neural networks involved in self-representation. As such, Letheby argues, 
psychedelic users gain knowledge by acquaintance with these two facts. 
 Letheby (2015) also claims that psychedelic states can have indirect epistemic benefits 
via their apparent therapeutic effects. First, he points out that pathologies for which 
psychedelics show promise, such as depression and addiction, are characterised by cognitive 
rigidity (cf. Carhart-Harris et al. 2014). Those who suffer from such conditions find it difficult 
to imagine other possibilities for themselves. Letheby cites research suggesting that 
psychedelics are therapeutic, in part, because they shake the brain out of its rut, allowing 
dysfunctional neural networks to be reset into a healthier configuration. He suggests that when 
this has lasting antidepressant or antiaddictive effects, it is likely to translate into an improved 
capacity to acquire modal knowledge—knowledge about possibility, necessity, impossibility, 
and so on—about one’s own mind (Letheby, 2015). On this view, certain psychiatric patients 
suffer an epistemic deficit due to cognitive inflexibility; controlled psychedelic administration 
can alleviate the inflexibility and thereby remedy the deficit (Letheby, 2015). 
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 Letheby (2016) also draws on Bortolotti’s (2015, 2020) work on epistemic benefits of 
pathological cognitions to argue for further indirect epistemic benefits of psychedelic therapy. 
He echoes Bortolotti’s argument that epistemic functionality and psychosocial functionality 
are deeply intertwined in humans. Bortolotti points out that some of the main ways in which 
humans gain knowledge involve engaging with the world, exploring, talking to other people, 
exposing one’s ideas to scrutiny, and so on. Pathologies such as anxiety, depression, and 
addiction tend to decrease people’s propensity to engage with the world in this way. Thus, 
Letheby (2016) argues that when psychedelics reduce symptoms of these pathologies, this is 
likely to improve patients’ epistemic functionality too. He proposes that a similar effect might 
be observed in healthy subjects, citing findings from MacLean et al. (2011) that psilocybin-
induced mystical experiences can increase the personality domain of Openness to 
Experience—plausibly a pro-epistemic trait—for up to 14 months (Letheby, 2016).  
 Lavazza (2017) has contested Letheby’s attribution of epistemic benefits to psychedelic 
states, suggesting that the benefits in question seem “more motivational than epistemic” (p. 
250). However, he offers no explicit argument for this claim. He also suggests that any self-
knowledge gained under psychedelic experience is only knowledge about what the self is like 
during psychedelic experience, not knowledge of the self “in its real environment” (ibid.) 
 Finally, Pittaway (2018) suggests that, by altering attention and de-familiarizing the 
world, allowing us to see things anew, psychedelics can foster a type of ‘philosophical 
perception’ similar to that pursued in the mystical and contemplative practices typical of 
ancient Greek philosophy. In other words, for Pittaway (2018), there is a strong similarity 
between psychedelic consciousness and the distinctively philosophical consciousness prized 
by the ancients who practiced philosophy as a way of life. (Nicolas Langlitz (2016) discusses 
similar themes in his reflection on whether psychedelics can have a place in 21st-century 
philosophy.) Pittaway suggests that the phrase “to learn healing knowledge”, coined by 
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Sobiecki (2012) in his discussion of indigenous South African use of psychoactive plants, aptly 




Three distinct issues concerning ethics and psychedelics have been attracting philosophical 
attention. One concerns the ethical implications of the epistemological issues just discussed: 
How much, if at all, does it matter whether psychedelic experiences involve real insights or 
“comforting delusions”? The second concerns the broader question: under what circumstances 
it is morally acceptable to administer such an unusual and potentially transformative 
intervention? The third concerns whether psychedelics themselves might function as effective 
agents of moral enhancement—i.e. the promotion of beneficial moral capacities or dispositions 
in individuals, by broadly biological or broadly technological means—and what follows, if so. 
 
The ethics of belief  
It is one thing to ask whether psychedelic experiences afford genuine insights or not, and 
another thing to ask whether it matters. Philosophical discussions of psychedelic-assisted 
psychotherapy (henceforth “psychedelic therapy”) have explored the question: should we care 
about the epistemic status of this intervention? Despite disagreeing on what that status is, both 
Letheby (2016) and Lavazza (2017) agree that we should care. Lavazza (2017) contrasts 
“realistic” methods for promoting well-being, that involve gaining genuine knowledge of 
reality, with “unrealistic” methods that involve misrepresentation. According to him, 
psychedelic therapy belongs in the latter class, and therefore warrants caution (Lavazza, 2017). 
In a similar vein, Letheby (2016) cites Nozick’s (1974/2013) “Experience Machine” thought 
experiment, as well as discussing Pascal’s Wager (Pascal, 1670/2006), to argue that we should 
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be reluctant to embrace a therapeutic modality with significant unmitigated epistemic costs. 
For Letheby (2016), the main costs to worry about are the promotion of non-naturalistic 
metaphysical beliefs in a divine Ground of Being or cosmic consciousness. However, despite 
agreeing on the normative claim that the epistemic status of psychedelic therapy matters, 
Letheby (2016) ultimately comes out in its favour: he argues that the adoption of non-
naturalistic beliefs is not an inevitable result of psychedelic therapy, and when it does occur, is 
offset by the naturalistically acceptable epistemic benefits detailed above (e.g. the acquisition 
of various kinds of knowledge by acquaintance, and various indirect benefits; see the 
“Knowledge” section). 
 On the other hand, Flanagan and Graham (2017) have argued that the epistemic status 
of the psychedelic experience is relatively unimportant compared to its capacity to help people 
live good, happy, flourishing lives (Flanagan 2017, 2018; Flanagan and Graham, 2017). This 
is part of their broader project to protest the pathologization of various mental states on 
epistemic grounds. Flanagan and Graham point out that there is no “clear, precise, or firm link” 
(2017, p. 293) between epistemic accuracy and mental health; neither is necessary nor 
sufficient for the other. As such, even though they conceive of psychedelic experiences as 
“metaphysical hallucinations”, they argue that the induction and pursuit of such hallucinations 
can be ethically justified on the basis of their apparent psychological, existential, and perhaps 
even ethical benefits (cf. Flanagan, 2017, 2018). 
 Similarly, Greif and Šurkala (2020) argue that we ought not be concerned about 
epistemic risks stemming from the use of psilocybin in compassionate psychedelic therapy 
(PT). They disagree with Letheby’s (2016) naturalistic position that psychedelic therapy 
involves comforting delusions that are epistemically harmful. For Greif and Šurkala, the 
permissibility of compassionate PT can be evaluated on a risk/benefit ratio, and against other 
medical interventions (e.g., palliative care). These authors note that there is no scientific 
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evidence that suggests the acquisition of non-naturalistic beliefs is part of the causal mechanism 
of psychedelic therapy. Even if there were such evidence, however, they argue that this would 
not be sufficient to deem psychedelic therapy unethical (Greif and Šurkala, 2020). Their main 
contention is that naturalism is a controversial stance in the highly contested field of 
philosophical metaphysics, and as such, has no business dictating medical practice. According 
to Greif and Šurkala, even if psychedelic therapy did demonstrably impose non-naturalistic 
beliefs on patients, in order to know that this amounted to epistemic harm, we would need to 
know that naturalism is true. However, since (they argue) we do not know the truth of 
naturalism, we do not know that the acquisition of non-naturalistic beliefs would constitute 
epistemic harm; thus, this possibility does not provide compelling grounds for concern about 
psychedelic therapy. This is the major difference between their position and that of Letheby 
(2016), who assumes that the truth of naturalism is, indeed, an object of knowledge. 
 Finally, McMillan (2020) responds to epistemic concerns about psychedelic therapy by 
drawing on ideas from hedonistic moral theories, arguing that in cases of extreme suffering, 
hedonic benefits outweigh epistemic risks. He also echoes Letheby’s contention that the 
epistemic profile of psychedelic therapy may be better than it initially appears. 
 From this brief overview, we can see that questions about epistemic ethics and 
epistemology itself are deeply intertwined. Some argue that psychedelics impose 
misrepresentations and cognitive distortions that amount to epistemic harm. Others argue that 
evidence for the therapeutic and transformative effects of psychedelics outweighs their 
potential epistemic risks. 
 
Enhanced consent 
Smith and Sisti (2020) have raised the important question: Under what circumstances is it 
ethical to administer an intervention that can induce unusual, and potentially radically 
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transformative, experiences? These authors focus specifically on psychedelic-induced mystical 
experiences, in which subjects commonly describe a “sense of new, ineffable knowledge, 
feelings of unity and connection and encounters with ‘deep’ reality or God” (Smith and Sisti, 
2020, p. 1). Smith and Sisti cite studies suggesting that these specific types of experiences may 
mediate lasting changes to subjects’ attitudes, beliefs, and personality (Carhart-Harris et al., 
2018; Erritzoe et al., 2018; Davis et al., 2020; Nour et al., 2017).  As such, they draw on clinical 
research to argue that an “enhanced consent” process is ethically required in psychedelic 
therapy due to the unusual features of this treatment. 
 Smith and Sisti propose three potential categories of effects that are unique to 
psilocybin and entail ethical requirements that go beyond what is typically prescribed for 
psychotropic medications (e.g., SSRIs, antipsychotics). First, psilocybin may elicit undesirable 
changes to subjects’ beliefs, values, and personalities; for example, “non-spiritual, agnostic or 
atheist patients may take the development of a newfound sense of spirituality or belief in God 
to be a loss if it is incongruent with their prior values or if it is disruptive to relationships with 
others” (Smith and Sisti, 2020, p. 3). (Here, there is a connection with the issues of epistemic 
ethics discussed in the previous sub-section.) Second, psilocybin may pose various mental 
health risks; for example, intense acute episodes of anxiety, lasting psychotic reactions, and 
trauma re-exposure due to the reliving of traumatic memories. Third, the use of therapeutic 
touch in psychedelic therapy can blur ethical boundaries, particularly when subjects are in a 
vulnerable state of mind; for example, subjects can unexpectedly change their mind about 
whether or not they would like therapeutic touch during the psychedelic experience.  
 Smith and Sisti describe standard consent procedures as more straightforward, since in 
the cases of most psychiatric pharmaceuticals, side-effects can be described quickly and 
understood easily, such as dizziness, nausea, and weight gain. For them, the peculiar side-
effects of psilocybin calls for a more comprehensive consent procedure:  
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“In general, the fundamental elements of disclosure are the nature of the procedure, the 
risks and potential benefits and what alternatives may be available. While debate 
continues about the specificity regarding these elements in various contexts, there is 
consensus that the standards vary according to context and the intervention in question. 
For instance, standards for invasive surgery are higher than those for blood draw” (Smith 
and Sisti, 2020, p. 3). 
 
Other reasons for enhanced consent include their contention that little is known about the neural 
mechanisms by which psilocybin works in the brain, making it difficult to explain its effects 
on cognition (Smith and Sisti, 2020). Smith and Sisti do acknowledge that, in current practice, 
the potential for distressing or transformative experiences is discussed in preparatory sessions. 
However, they suggest that these sessions be extended into the actual consent process while 
“offering recurrent opportunity [sic] to improve subject understanding and achieve enhanced 
consent” (2020, p. 3).  
 Finally, these authors emphasize the importance of future research. As psilocybin 
transitions from controlled clinical settings to clinical practise, ethical challenges will emerge 
and change the nature of the intervention, which will require critical evaluation. Thus, avenues 
of research should include understanding how psilocybin elicits personal transformation and 
developing standardized protocols for informed consent procedures across psychedelic studies 
(Smith and Sisti, 2020).  
 
Psychedelic moral enhancement 
The third ethical issue concerns the putative use of psychedelics for purposes of moral 
enhancement: Might psychedelics function as effective agents of moral enhancement? If so, 
under what circumstances is it ethical to administer them as such? Interest in moral 
enhancement (or moral bioenhancement) techniques is motivated by the contention that 
humans lack the moral capacity to respond appropriately to global issues and social inequalities 
in the face of rapid technological advancements (Ballesteros, 2019; Hidalgo, 2018; Tennison, 
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2012; Schermer, 2007). One ground for this concern is that deep-rooted prejudiced attitudes 
discourage cosmopolitan relations between people (Hidalgo, 2018; see also Schermer, 2007). 
Several authors have discussed moral neuroenhancement and various putative 
“neuroenhancers” for their potential to augment not only moral capacities, but also morally 
relevant cognitive capacities, such as empathy, fairness, and altruism (Ahlskog, 2017; Earp, 
2018; Tennison, 2012). As such, some have suggested that psychedelics may be a viable way 
to improve individuals’ moral character and cognition (Earp, 2018; cf. Ahlskog, 2017; 
Tennison, 2012).  
 Some draw on psychedelic evidence to suggest that psychedelics durably increase 
prosocial behaviour, empathy, and the personality trait of Openness to Experience (Ahlskog, 
2017; Ballesteros, 2019; Earp, 2018; Tennison, 2012). Earp (2018) discusses psychedelics as 
a promising alternative to currently available “smart drugs”, gene therapies, and brain 
stimulation devices. He considers the latter as “one-dimensional interventions into specific 
capacities” (Earp, 2018, p. 16) that do not target a broader moral domain. He also notes that 
such interventions may not successfully “tweak” an individual cognitive capacity (e.g., 
empathy), given the complex and interconnected cognitive architecture of the brain. As such, 
Earp proposes that psychedelics might enhance moral capacities in a “global” and “flexible” 
way, allowing people to respond to different kinds of situations. In a similar vein, Ahlskog 
(2017) argues that directly modulating empathy alone may have adverse effects, such as 
unintentional empathetic responses, which may compromise autonomy (see also Ballesteros, 
2019). However, rather than directly augmenting moral and prosocial motivations, he argues, 
a more effective route to developing higher moral values and altruistic behaviours may lie in 
“decreasing self-interest”. Ahlskog cites evidence from LSD and psilocybin research that links 
phenomenological reports of a diminished sense of self with neural correlates of self-awareness, 
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and proposes that psychedelics diminish self-interest, “in a quite literal sense, rather than as a 
by-product of for example increases in empathy” (p. 368).  
 Similarly, Millière et al. (2018) have considered the possible link between interruptions 
of self-consciousness and prosocial behaviours induced by psychedelics, and ask whether 
temporary selfless states might promote selflessness in the moral sense. They argue that further 
research is required to confirm this relationship and urge caution in conflating selfless states 
with ‘selflessness’ as a moral construct (Millière et al., 2018). 
 Finally, Ballesteros (2019) discusses psychedelic moral enhancement in the context of 
environmental and technological ethics. She draws on the work of Günther Anders to argue 
that humans are morally blind to their obligations resulting from technological advances and 
associated ecological challenges. According to Ballesteros, psychedelic mysticism can result 
in enhanced moral faculties. She cites phenomenological reports of self-transcendence and 
feelings of interconnection with others and nature, as well as studies providing evidence of 
increases in prosocial and altruistic behaviors lasting up to 14 months post-psilocybin (Griffiths 
et al. 2008, 2011). Thus, Ballesteros suggests psychedelics “widen” moral capacities and thus, 
may help us overcome our moral blindness.  
 
RELIGION AND SPIRITUALITY 
The fourth and final line of inquiry we will discuss is motivated by the broader philosophical 
project to naturalize spirituality, predicated on the idea that there may be religious and spiritual 
practices or attitudes that do not require a commitment to supernaturalistic or non-naturalistic 
beliefs (Letheby, 2017; Steinhart, 2018b). Some psychedelic subjects report transformative 
experiences of self-loss, connectedness, and profound meaning, in the apparent absence of non-
naturalistic metaphysical content (Letheby, 2017; Steinhart, 2018b). As such, some 
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philosophers have drawn on psychedelic science to develop empirically informed accounts of 
naturalistic forms of spirituality or religion.  
 Steinhart (2018a) argues that religious naturalism must prescribe practices that embody 
genuinely religious ways of living in the natural world. Entheogenic (i.e., psychedelic-based) 
religions, he claims, fit the naturalistic bill because they involve using psychedelics to induce 
spiritual experiences without requiring non-naturalistic beliefs. Steinhart (2018b) proposes that 
psychedelics are “technologies” for achieving spiritual self-realization— “the existential 
unification of the self with nature” (p. 343), in line with the concept of eudaimonia, or human 
flourishing. He points to the Mystical Experience Questionnaire used in much psychedelic 
research as a way to examine the relationship between phenomenological reports of religious 
experiences (e.g., a connectedness with all living things) and neural correlates of self-related 
states. He draws on evidence from this research that such existential unification “depends on 
changes in [specific] neural networks in the brain” (2018b, p. 349). For Steinhart this supports 
psychedelics’ potential as tools for developing forms of religious practice compatible with 
naturalism.  
 Letheby (2017) raises the important question: Can psychedelics help us find solutions 
to the existential crisis emerging from a scientific and naturalistic worldview? Flanagan and 
Caruso (2017) contend that a distinctive neuroexistential crisis, emerging from neuroscientific 
advancements, has shifted human’s self-conception towards a meaningless and disenchanted 
scientific image. As Letheby puts it, “with every new stride in the neuroscientific mapping of 
the material bases of decision making, reward, emotions, and so on, this [disenchanted, 
naturalistic] reality becomes ever more palpable” (2017, p. 625). Letheby (2017) proposes that 
psychedelics may play a practical role in the naturalizing spirituality project and act as an 
“existential medicine”, by facilitating a sense of meaning in life and revealing the conditions 
under which humans can experience eudaimonia. He cites Carhart-Harris et al.’s (2014) 
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neuroimaging findings connecting psilocybin-induced experiences of self-transcendence, 
broadening of perspectives, and interconnectedness, to reduced activity in the default mode 
network (DMN)—a system of brain structures involved in self-representation. Letheby 
proposes that these “neurocognitive systems” may generate an illusory sense of self that 
“[constrains] cognition and consciousness in accordance with representations of the goals, 
priorities, and predicaments of that self” (2017, p. 639) causing existential anxiety. For him, 
these findings suggest that what is central to psychedelic therapy is disruption to the sense of 
self, leading to changes in perspectives and attention, wonder and awe, and appreciation of the 
natural world—not non-naturalistic metaphysical beliefs.  
 Despite differences of approach, Letheby (2017) and Steinhart (2018a, 2018b) agree 
that psychedelics afford transformative experiences that can result in perspectival and 
existential changes that are paradigmatic for developing spiritual naturalism, and moreover, 
provide practical ways to overcome existential distress. For both, naturalistically acceptable 
religious and spiritual experiences induced by psychedelics centrally involve transcendence of 
the sense of self and feelings of interconnection with nature.  
 For a relevant, anthropological essay on mystic materialism in the revival of 
psychedelic research, see Langlitz (2012). For a Foucauldian argument that psychedelic 
consumption can be a genuine spiritual practice, see Stokkink (2015).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Renewed scientific interest in serotonergic psychedelics has prompted intriguing discussions 
at the intersection of academic philosophy and psychedelic science. We have provided an 
overview of four emerging lines of research that have gained considerable traction in the last 
decade: philosophy of mind, epistemology, ethics, and religious/spiritual naturalism. 
Psychedelic evidence has contributed to ongoing debates about self-consciousness. The 
psychedelic experience itself has been subjected to epistemological analysis. Various authors 
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have examined ethical issues concerning psychedelic use and possible moral enhancement 
applications of psychedelics. Finally, others have enlisted psychedelic evidence in the service 
of naturalistic spirituality and religious naturalism. 
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